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Major shortcomings in a recently published group key establishment protocol
are described; this protocol enables any participant to choose and broadcast a
secret key to a group of other participants. We show that any valid recipient
of a broadcast can successfully impersonate the originator of that broadcast to
send a new key to the original set of recipients. Also, if a broadcast key is ever
compromised, then any party (insider or outsider) who learns this key can force
its reuse indefinitely. These shortcomings are sufficiently serious that the protocol
should not be used.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Harn and Hsu [1] recently published a protocol designed
to provide authenticated group key establishment. In
this brief note we describe a number of serious security
issues with this scheme; in particular it does not provide
the properties claimed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 defines the protocol, including the intended
context of use. Section 3 then describes a number of
serious issues with the protocol. The paper concludes
in section 4.
2. THE HARN-HSU KEY ESTABLISH-
MENT PROTOCOL
2.1. Context and goals
The protocol is intended for use by a pre-established
community of users, and enables any subset (group) of
this community to agree on a shared secret key, where
this secret key can be chosen and distributed by any
member of the community. Group key establishment
protocols have been widely discussed in the literature
for many years — see, for example, chapter 6 of Boyd
and Mathuria [2]. Indeed, the area is so well-established
that an ISO/IEC standard for group key establishment
[3] was published back in 2011.
The threat model for such protocols varies, but
typically the goal is that, after completion of the
protocol, all participants agree on the same key, they
know it is ‘fresh’, and that no parties other than those
intended learn anything about the key.
As far as the protocol described by Harn and Hsu
[1] is concerned, the following statements are made
regarding its intended use and properties.
• ‘In our protocol, each member needs a pair of long-
term DH [Diffie-Hellman] private and public keys
and the long-term DH public key has been digitally
signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)’.
• ‘The group key is determined by an initiator of
the group communication and broadcasts the group
key to all group members. The initiator can be
any member in a group communication. Each
group key is used for only one communication
session. When a new group communication session
is established, a new group key will be generated
by an initiator’. From this statement (and the use
of ‘long-term’) it is clear that the DH private and
public keys are intended for use to establish many
group keys.
• ‘The digital certificate of public keys of group
members will be used by an initiator to assure that
the group key can only be decrypted by legitimate
group members but not by any non-members’.
This establishes a key goal of the protocol, i.e. to
ensure that the established key is only available to
the parties intended by the initiator.
Section 2.2 of Harn and Hsu [1] (entitled ‘Types
of attackers’), describes the two classes of attackers
against which the protocol is intended to be robust,
namely insider attackers and outside attackers. The
paper states ‘The insider attacker is a legitimate
member who knows the group key . . . [and] is able
to impersonate other members in a secure group
communication’. As we show in section 3.4 below,
precisely such an insider attack is possible. This
contradicts the claim made ([1], section 2.2.2) that
‘none of these attacks can work properly against our
protocol’.
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2.2. Related work
The Harn-Hsu protocol uses a combination of secret
sharing and Diffie-Hellman key agreement. The use
of secret sharing as part of a group key establishment
protocol is long-established (see, for example, section
6.7.2 of Boyd and Mathuria [2]). However, this
approach is known to have shortcomings; in particular
the following issue is described in [2].
However, when we look at the question of
sending different session keys over time there
are some problems. A malicious principal who
obtains one key gains information regarding
the shares of other principals . . .
As we describe below, a related problem arises with the
Harn-Hsu scheme. Indeed, the fact that the Harn-Hsu
protocol has serious flaws is hardly surprising given the
unfortunate history of the area. Back in 2010, Harn and
Lin [4] described a group key transfer protocol based on
secret sharing which is not only mathematically flawed,
but also possesses very serious security issues; this gave
rise not only to a number of papers pointing out the
flaws (see, for example, [5, 6]), but also to further flawed
protocols attempting to ‘fix’ these flaws. Some of the
history of this domain can be found in the recent paper
of Liu et al [7].
2.3. The protocol
The following requirements apply for use of the
protocol.
• The protocol is designed to work within a set
U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} of n users.
• Integers p, q and g must be agreed by all members
of U , where p is a large prime (a length of 1024 bits
is suggested), q is a prime factor of p− 1 (a length
of 160 bits is suggested), and g (1 < g < p) is a
generator of Zq. All participants must also agree
on a one-way hash-function h.
• Every user Ui must:
– have a unique identifier IDi (an integer
satisfying 0 ≤ IDi ≤ q − 1), and
– choose a Diffie-Hellman private key xi ∈ Zq,
and obtain a CA-signed certificate for the
associated public key yi = g
xi mod q.
Now suppose user Uw wishes to act as an initiator,
and establish a new secret key K between the members
of a group of users U ′ (U ′ ⊆ U). It is not stated
explicitly, but the initiator can choose the key K
freely (and, presumably, at random). Suppose U ′ =
{Uz1 , Uz2 , . . . , Uz`} for some ` (1 ≤ ` ≤ n), where
1 ≤ zi ≤ n for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ `).
Observe that we have made two minor changes to
the notation of [1] to avoid possible confusion. Harn
and Hsu refer to the initiator as Us, but they also
use s to denote a ephemeral secret known only to the
initiator. They refer to the members of the group U ′
as {Ur1 , Ur2 , . . . , Ur`}, but they then use r to denote a
function of the ephemeral secret s.
The initiator proceeds as follows.
1. The initiator selects a one-time (ephemeral) secret
s ∈ Zq, and computes r = gs mod q.
2. The initiator obtains trusted copies of the public
keys yzi of every member of U ′, e.g. by obtaining
and verifying the relevant public key certificates,
and for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ `) uses its own private
key xw and the ephemeral secret s to compute a
one-time shared secret key
kzi = (y
xw+s
zi mod p) mod q.
3. The initiator uses Lagrange interpolation to
determine a polynomial f(x) of degree ` which
passes through the following set of ` + 1 points:
{(0,K), (IDz1 , kz1), (IDz2 , kz2), . . . , (IDz` , kz`)}
observing that the key K is treated here as an
integer in Zq, i.e. the choice of q constrains the
length of the established key K.
4. The initiator chooses an arbitrary set S =
{a1, a2, . . . , a`} of size `, where ai ∈ Zq for every i
and S∩U ′ = ∅, and computes the `+1 public values
(a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (a`, f(a`)) and h(t||K),
where t is a timestamp.
5. The initiator now broadcasts r, t and the ` + 1
public values
(a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (a`, f(a`)), h(t||K)
to all members of U ′.
On receipt of the broadcast, each user Uzi ∈ U ′
(1 ≤ i ≤ `) proceeds as follows.
1. Uzi recomputes the one-time secret key (shared
with the initiator) as:
kzi = ((ryw)
xzi mod p) mod q.
2. Uzi uses Lagrange interpolation to recompute the
polynomial f(x) of degree `, using the following set
of ` + 1 points:
{(IDzi , kzi), (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (a`, f(a`))}.
Uzi can now recover K
′ = f(0).
3. Uzi verifies that the received timestamp t is
sufficiently recent, computes h(t||K ′), and checks
that this equals the received hash value. If so, the
recomputed key K ′ is correct, i.e. K ′ = K, and can
be used for group communication.
2.4. Security claims
Amongst others, Harn and Hsu [1] make the following
claims regarding the security properties of the protocol.
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1. The protocol provides key authentication. The
meaning of this is not made completely clear, but
it would appear that (and following common use
of the term) this means that the group member
can verify that the key originates from the claimed
initiator and that it is a ‘fresh’ key, i.e. it was
sent by the initiator at the time indicated in the
timestamp t.
2. The security of the secret sharing encryption is
unconditionally secure.
3. ANALYSIS
We now describe a number of serious issues with the
protocol, including cases where the protocol does not
satisfy the security properties claimed of it.
3.1. Missing information
We firstly observe that, apart from the abuses of
notation observed above, the specification is missing
certain key elements, including the following.
• It is not explicitly stated that IDi must be an
element of Zq.
• The message broadcast by the initiator must
contain both the identifier of the initiator and the
identifiers of the members of the group U ′. If the
latter was not the case, then every user in U would
be obliged to attempt to obtain the key K, and will
only discover they are not a member of the group U ′
when the hash comparison fails. This would impose
a very significant unnecessary computational load
on the global user set. Moreover, the intended
recipients would not know which other users know
the key, making its use problematic.
3.2. Unconditional security
It is claimed that ‘the security of the secret sharing
encryption is unconditionally secure’ (see claim 2 of
section 2.4). However, it is easy to see that the only
part of the scheme which can be considered as in any
sense unconditionally secure is the reconstruction of
f . However, if the discrete logarithm problem can be
solved with respect to g in Zp, then clearly all user
private keys can be obtained from their public keys,
meaning that anyone with access to the relevant public
keys can obtain K from a broadcast. That is, in no
sense is the encryption of K unconditionally secure.
3.3. Effects of compromise of a group key
Suppose a group key K is compromised, i.e. it becomes
available to a malicious party M (insider or outsider),
who also has access to the corresponding broadcast
message, i.e.:
r, t, h(t||K), (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (a`, f(a`)).
M can now, at any time, choose a current timestamp,
t′ say, and compute h(t′||K). M can now impersonate
the initator and send the slightly modified broadcast
message:
r, t′, h(t′||K), (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (a`, f(a`)).
This will be accepted as valid by all the recipients of
the original (valid) broadcast, i.e. they will accept K
as a newly generated, authentic key. This attack can
be repeated as many times as M wishes, i.e. M can
force continued use of a compromised key indefinitely,
breaking key authentication (i.e. claim 1 of section 2.4).
3.4. Impersonation of an initiator
Suppose user Uzi is a valid recipient of a broadcast, i.e.
Uzi ∈ U ′; then, since Uzi can compute the polynomial
f(x) used in this broadcast, Uzi can also compute all
the one-time secret keys
kz1 , kz2 , . . . , kz`
for members of the group U ′, simply by computing f(zj)
for every j (1 ≤ j ≤ `, j 6= i).
This information enables Uzi to impersonate the valid
initiator in a broadcast of a key chosen by Uzi to the
original set of recipients (or any subset of the original
set of recipients) at any time. The attack works in the
following way.
1. Uzi chooses a new key K
∗ and a current timestamp
t∗.
2. Uzi uses Lagrange interpolation to determine a
polynomial f∗(x) of degree ` which passes through
the following set of ` + 1 points:
{(0,K∗), (IDz1 , kz1), (IDz2 , kz2), . . . , (IDz` , kz`)}.
3. Uzi now chooses a set S
∗ = {a∗1, a∗2, . . . , a∗`}
of size `, where a∗i ∈ Zq for every i and
S∗ ∩ U ′ = ∅, and computes the ` + 1
values (a∗1, f(a
∗
1)), (a
∗
2, f(a
∗
2)), . . . , (a
∗
` , f(a
∗
` )) and
h(t∗||K∗).
4. Finally Uzi impersonates the original initiator
to broadcast r (taken from the original valid
broadcast), t∗ and the ` + 1 values computed in
the previous step to all members of U ′.
5. It is straightforward to verify that the broadcast
will be accepted by all members of the group U ′.
That is, at any time after the original broadcast,
any of the recipients of the broadcast can send a new
broadcast message containing a new key and timestamp
to all the members of the original group, impersonating
the original initiator. This insider attack clearly
breaks the key authentication property (i.e. claim 1
of section 2.4), and is also clearly something that the
designers of the protocol did not intend to be possible
since, as discussed in section 2.1, insider attackers are
part of the Harn-Hsu threat model.
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Note that this attack relates to the observation
made by Boyd and Mathuria [2] regarding the security
properties of key establishment protocols based on
secret sharing — see section 2.2.
4. CONCLUSIONS
As demonstrated above, the protocol proposed by Harn
and Hsu [1] fails to possess the properties claimed of
it. In particular, any valid recipient of a broadcast
can successfully impersonate the originator of that
broadcast to send a new key to the original set of
recipients. Also, if a broadcast key is ever compromised,
then any party (insider or outsider) who learns this key
can force its reuse indefinitely.
This means that the protocol should not be used.
It is important to observe that the Harn-Hsu paper
does not include a rigorous security proof using the
state of the art ‘provable security’ techniques, nor is
there a formal model of security for the protocol. This
helps to explain why fundamental flaws exist. Indeed,
the following observation, made by Liu et al. [7] with
respect to a number of previously proposed but flawed
group key establishment protocols, is hugely pertinent.
The security proof for each vulnerable GKD
protocol only relies on incomplete or informal
arguments. It can be expected that they would
suffer from attacks.
It would, of course, be tempting to try to repair the
protocol to address the issues identified, but, unless a
version can be devised with an accompanying security
proof, there is a strong chance that subtle flaws will
remain. Certainly the analysis necessary to find the
flaws listed above was completed in a couple of hours,
and no attempt was made to discover all the possible
attacks.
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